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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Clandestine Services Comments on the Conclusions and Recommendation of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities Dealing with CIA War Planning and Preparation

1. BACKGROUND

The Hoover Commission Task Force Report (dated May 1955) on the Defense Department contained the following conclusions and recommendation directed at the Clandestine Services of CIA.

Conclusion: Either CIA has been unable to develop and maintain adequate assets in the escape and evasion and guerrilla warfare areas or is furnishing inadequate information to the Services concerning its assets. Such a condition can only result in duplication of effort, inadequate planning, and failure in operation.

Recommendation: "That the National Security Council review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare."

In August 1955 the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the President Department of Defense views and concurred in the recommendation of the Hoover Commission Task Force cited above and commented as follows:

"National and theater war planning for evasion and escape and guerrilla warfare is at present hampered by a lack of information on the status of development of covert assets in support of these activities. In order to facilitate the review recommended, CIA and the Department of Defense should report the pertinent facts to the National Security Council with recommendations for necessary action. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) will initiate a proposal within the Department of Defense looking to the preparation of an appropriate report."

2. DISCUSSION

See Tabs "A" through "C".

3. SUMMARY

Although the conclusion arrived at is no doubt valid based upon the statements made to the committee, it does not reflect a true or complete picture of either the current status or the progress made since the inception of war planning and coordination which has been achieved between CIA and the military. The recommendations of the Hoover Commission Task Force that the situation regarding CIA wartime assets be reviewed by the National Security Council is not concurred in by this Agency. Coordinated planning and the resulting preparation for Unconventional Warfare has not yet reached the stage that firm doctrine and concepts have been fully developed. This

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lack of development is not unreasonable when considered in light of the limited time in which Defense and CIA have been mutually engaged in the field of Unconventional Warfare. Considerable progress has recently been made in the development of more realistic concepts for unconventional warfare preparatory action. These concepts developed in the light of experience gained from current operations have assisted in establishing an atmosphere of realism in both Defense and CIA as to the types of requirements which lend themselves to fulfillment by clandestine means, and as to the level of operational effectiveness which can be expected of unconventional warfare forces during the immediate post D-Day period. In addition to the development of concepts for unconventional warfare, a Command Relationships Agreement reference the conduct of Unconventional Warfare was accepted by CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1952. CIA relations with the military have shown a marked improvement since that time. Subsequent to the formal agreement a series of understandings and arrangements have been concluded, and for the first time since coordinated planning was initiated the military and CIA have reached the stage where the completion of one planning cycle is imminent. Notwithstanding the difficulty in reaching common understanding, both in the field and at the Washington level, substantial progress has been achieved in three years. The relationships between the CIA field planners and their respective military staffs are excellent. Through memoranda, briefings, and conferences CIA has advised the military of the Agency capabilities for wartime support. Both sides are being mutually educated in the others problems. There has been a much broader comprehension that the effectiveness of enemy security services and the cold war priorities for intelligence from denied areas as well as for political and psychological action in the free or uncommitted areas have precluded greater development of UW capability by the CIA. Present military war plans reflect an understanding within Defense that little, if any, UW capability can be expected in the denied areas prior to D-day regardless of the amount of money or effort expended. In the absence of formalized military requirements, anticipatory action has been taken to develop a wartime support capability. This action to date has met with meager success in the denied areas. However as can be seen from the tabulation of requirements and assets contained in Tab D, a considerable Unconventional Warfare potential (both hot war and convertible cold war) has been developed, with certain significant area exceptions, in the non-denied areas. This should enable the Agency to accept with existing assets a substantial portion of projected military requirements in those areas. The formalization of Unconventional Warfare requirements which is expected in the near future must be followed by more vigorous efforts on the part of the Agency if those in the denied areas are to be fulfilled. Because of the nature of CIA operations, political considerations, and the inherent lack of stability in the use of indigenous personnel for this type work, it is doubtful if at any time in the future we can fulfill any significant portion of wartime requirements with assets resident in the denied areas. Until the outstanding intelligence requirements for the denied areas are much better satisfied, it appears that CIA will have to rely primarily upon (1) conversion of cold war assets for hot war unconventional warfare tasks, (2) assets developed jointly with friendly clandestine services, and, (3) small numbers of indigenous assets recruited, trained, and held outside the denied areas for post D-Day infiltration into the target areas. Further preparatory action to fulfill the requirements for CIA's wartime unconventional warfare mission must be balanced

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against the outstanding peacetime priority requirements in the fields of espionage and psychological and political action. Such a balancing of effort must necessarily recognize the currently overriding requirement for CIA to assist in winning the cold war even at the expense of separate hot war preparations. In wartime the majority of CIA's current assets will be employed in the most effective measure possible to support military operations.


4. CONCLUSIONS

a. That part of the Task Force (Clark) conclusion that states the CIA "is furnishing inadequate information to the Services concerning its assets" is not valid.

b. Within the limitations imposed by the lack of clear useage of the term adequate in the Task Force conclusion the CIA has been able to develop and maintain reasonably adequate assets in the escape and evasion and guerrilla warfare areas in the non-denied countries with the exception of certain areas in which developmental programs have not been vigorously pursued because of policy restrictions or other limiting factors.

c. Notwithstanding the absence of firm, realistic requirements from the various CINCs (See Tab F) the capabilities of the CIA to discharge its wartime Unconventional Warfare responsibility for support to the military is inadequate in the denied areas. Operational difficulties will probably preclude the generation of any significant numbers of resident agents in the future in the denied areas. Utilization of an alternate proposal contained in the "Criteria Paper"(e.g., generating and holding assets outside the denied areas for post D-Day infiltration) will serve to meet the military support requirements after the opening of hostilities.

d. The recommendation of the Task Force (Clark) "that the NSC review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare" is untimely in view of limited period of time in which the military and CIA have been mutually engaged in coordinated planning in these fields.



TABS A thru J,
21 pages
withheld